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THE RANGE SAFETY PROBLEM
"A THORN IN THE FLESH"
J. R. Duffett
J. N. Thi Iges
TRW Systems

Florida Operations

Introduct ion
The range safety problem is truly "a
thorn in the flesh" to the user of the
missile test ranges. The range user has
one objective in mind: to get his missile
off the ground and successfully complete
his test objectives. Any thing that inter
feres with that objective is, to him, an
evil he can do without. Range Safety has
often been considered such an evil - albeit
a necessary one. Possibly a misunderstanding
of the problem is the basis for this feeling.
This paper endeavors to present the problem
in its proper perspective by defining the
problem and presenting the means used by the
Range Safety Division of the ranges to assess,
control and/or eliminate the risks involved
in a missile flight. It starts by describing
a typical flight, defines the problem, des
cribes how the problem is controlled, and how
it is qualitatively measured.

An orbital flight was chosen since it
better presents the dilemma facing the test
range. The range is faced with the choice of
not permitting the flight, or of permitting it
to overfly inhabited land, both distasteful
from Range Safety's viewpoint.
In Figure 1, the powered flight terminates
with injection into orbit of the payload and
the final stage. Since this "typical" launch
vehicle consisted of three stages, the impact
locations of the preceding two stages are also
shown. The dotted line traversing the surface
of the earth below the missile trajectory is
the Instantaneous Impact Point (IIP). The IIP
is defined as that point on the surface of the
earth where the missile would impact if missile
thrust were terminated at any instant ("now")
during the powered portion of flight. Thus, for
a ballistic type missile the instantaneous
impact point at the time of computed engine shut
down corresponds to the target. The HP does not
correspond to the instantaneous sub-missile point
(the intersection of the vertical from the missile
with the surface of the earth) except during the
vertical rise portion of powered flight. The
velocity of the IIP will vary exponentially from
0 feet per second during vertical rise to several
hundred miles per second at burnout of a ballistic
missile, to essentially infinity at injection
into orbit of an orbital vehicle, at which point
the IIP "vanishes" or leaves the surface of the
earth. The progressions of the IIP and submissile point during a typical ballistic missile
powered flight are also shown in Figure 2.

This paper is limited to flight safety,
i.e., that period which commences with lift
off of the missile. Pad safety and ground
safety (e.g., propellant handling) are not
d i scussed.
The discussions herein are general in
sofar as possible. When it becomes necessary
to be specific, examples are chosen from the
AFETR, since we are more familiar with the
operating procedures and philosophies of that
range. They are, however, typical of all U.S.
test ranges.
We have tried throughout this report to
differentiate between range safety as a function
of the range, and Range Safety as a personi
fication of that function in the Range Safety
Division by means of capital letters.

Obviously, a successful flight as shown In
Figure 1 presents no problem. But a failed missile
may. The problem presented to Range Safety Is how
can life and property be adequately
a malfunctioning, or failed missile,
If It can
not be, what are the risks involved?
Safety
has the responsibility of protecting the launch
area and the downrange land areas. For the ETR,
launch area has been defined as the Cape Kennedy
launch complex and contiguous areas,
down range
as the islands and continents lying under or
adjacent to the flight
of the missile. One
obvious means of protecting downrange areas is
prohibiting any flight of a multistage vehicle
in which any stage impacts on or near land masses
if the flight is a success,
this Is done.

The Range Safety Problem
A typical missile flight can be divided
into two parts, viz., a powered flight portion
and a "free" flight or non-powered portion.
Range Safety is primarily concerned with the
powered flight portion, since usually only this
portion can be controlled by the range safety
function of the range. Figure 1 pictorializes
a typical successful orbital flight from the
AFETR.
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Observer who ii. turn relays the data to the
Range Safety Officer through voice communi
cations. This, however, is impertinent to
the discussion and understanding of the general
range safety system.) The Range Safety Officer
is in communication with the missile through the
range safety transmitter. Figs, k and 5 show a
simplified diagram of the range safety system.

Another method is prohibiting over
flight if it can be avoided without
seriously compromising test objectives, and
this is occasionally done. This can be
accomplished by maneuvers during powered flight,
for instance. Another means of protection is
the termination of thrust of an errant missile.
Determination of Failure

Flight Termination

Before the Range Safety Officer terminates
a flight, he must assure himself that the missile
is in fact in a failed condition. To do so, he
must rely on different types of equipment which
indicate incipient or developed failures. These
equipments are of two general types, viz., optical
and electrical (or electronic), as shown in
Figure 3^ Different types of equipment are used
during different portions of powered flight owing
to the differing requirements and inherent
limitations of the equipments.

The question arises, how does the Range
Safety Officer terminate flight? What control
does he have and can he exercise? A description
of either the ground or airborne flight termina
tion system details are beyond the scope of this
paper. Suffice it to say there is a coded trans
mitter on the ground and a coded receiver in the
missile. By transmitting the proper coded signals
to the missile, Range Safety can terminate flight
either manually or automatically, with manual the
preferred means. Manual termination can be
accomplished in either of two ways, viz., thrust
termination through shutting down the engines
(Manual Fuel Cutoff - MFCO), or destruct, with
the former the preferred method. (At the ETR, the
automatic cutoff was developed to shut off the
sustainer engine only on Atlas, hence the acronym
ASCO for "Automatic Sustainer Cutoff". This was
necessary to protect Station 12 from a failure
during the last few seconds of sustainer flight,
since because of the high IIP velocity, it could
not be done manually. It still permits the ver
nier engines to burn allowing the major parts of
the test objectives to be met. The IIP velocity
during the vernier portion is sufficiently slow
to permit manual control again. For certain
types of missions, this sustainer only cutoff can
be sent manually, and is then known by the acronym
MASCO, for manual sustainer cutoff.)

Optical equipments are the primary instru
mentation used during the lift-off, vertical
rise, and programming of the missile. These
consist of vertical wire sky screens and an
observer, to determine that the missile does not
deviate from allowable variations during lift off,
vertical rise, and pitch over, and from the flight
azimuth after completion of the pitch program.
This system has obvious limitations. It is there
fore supplemented by the telemetry electronic sky
screen equipment (telemetry ELSSE). This system
uses phase comparison of the telemetry carrier
frequency from two sites to measure variations
from the planned azimuth and pitch program, and
presents these variations, together with per
missible limitations, on strip charts. A recent
innovation has been the presentation of missile
rates (pitch, yaw, and roll) as measured and
monitored by telemetry on strip charts to indi
cate incipient failures. Since this system
reveals failures before they are obvious on the
other systems, it has become known as an antici
patory system, since It allows the Range Safety
0 ff i cer to anticipate the re s u 1 1 s of the fa I 1u re,
as opposed to the other systems which can be con
sidered confirmatory systems, since they confirm
that a failure has indeed occurred* All of these
systems at present rely upon a Range Safety
Observer to read and analyze the data, and present
the results orally to the Range Safety Officer.

Since not every failed missile will enhazard
land, there must be some criterion established to
distinguish between a hazardous and a nonhazardous failure. A non-hazardous failed missile
may permit recovery of data valuable to the test
program; therefore, from the range user's view
point, the flight should continue as long as data
can be recovered and until a definite hazard to
land exists. This criterion takes the form of
flight termination("destruct") lines on the range
safety charts. To properly locate these lines,
it is incumbent upon the range user to supply
Range Safety with missile performance data. These
data include the planned trajectory and the
expected deviations therefrom (i.e., the 3~sigma
maximum and minimum performance and lateral
trajectories) in the form of position, velocity,
accelerations, IIP locations, ground range,
flight path angle, engine thrust and other tra
jectory data specified by the range; turn
capabilities of the missile in pitch and in yaw
for trimmed and/or tumbling turns; the effects of
a missile breakup from destruct action or from
other causes; the impact locations of the various
stages; and the dispersions of the impact locations,

The radar systems use position measuring
radars to locate and track the missile in flight.
These may be pulsed radars such as the FPS-16,
or continuous wave radars such as the Mi strain.
They may also measure range rate, as the GE
Mod III does. The position data of the radar
(azimuth, elevation, range, and/or range rate)
are presented to a computer, which determines
the missile's present position and IIP. These
are presented directly to the Range Safety
Officer by means of plots on range safety charts.
(For some ETR launches, there is a secondary IIP
plot presented to an intermediary Range Safety
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These are combined with instrumentation
errors, wind effects, and allowance for
computation delays (since smoothing tech
niques are used) and human and electro
mechanical (transmission, relays, valves,
etc.) reaction times to locate the impact
limit or flight termination lines on present
position and IIP charts. Thus, when the
present position or IIP plotters indicate a
hazardous condition impends, the flight is
terminated. Figures 6, 7> 8, and 9 are
examples of range safety charts showing
flight termination lines. Figure 9 shows a
typical ASCO line as might be used on a long
range ballistic missile flight.

a solid propellant missile, early gu i dancecommanded shut down, etc.
b. A hard-over tumble (HOT) is defined as
complete loss of control of the thrust vector in
such a fashion that the engine nozzle (in the
case of nozzle angular position control of the
thrust vector) goes to its mechanical stops
(i.e., "hard over", hence the term "hard-over
tumble") due to some cuase as eccentricity of
the nozzle axis - missile axis or other mis
alignment of the thrust vector. Loss of control
may occur through loss of hydraulic fluid, for
instance, in an hydrau1ica1ly controlled nozzle
control unit.

The typical flight pictured in Figure 1
shows the IIP crossing over land. Obviously,
should a failure occur during the transit
time of the IIP across the land (the "exposure"
time), impact will occur and the range safety
function of protection of life and property
will have been compromised. In the event the
flight plan cannot be changed without unduly
jeopardizing the test objectives, it becomes
necessary to request Range Safety to waive its
restrictions to permit the flight to take place.
The request to waive these restrictions must be
documented, and the documentation must include
why a waiver is requested, i.e., the effects
upon the test objectives and program, and it must
include an analysis of the risks to which the
land and its inhabitants are exposed, i.e., the
probability of impact and the estimated number of
casualties as a result of an impact. We shall
limit ourselves to the discussion of the evalua
tion of the risks.

c. A gradual turn (GT) or instantaneous
impact point turn (IIP turn) is defined as loss
of thrust vector control such that the missile
does not go into a hard-over tumble but retains
some semblance of stability. The locus of IIP
turns from the intended locus, and either may
continue to turn, or may turn to a new azimuth
and continue along that direction. It may be
caused by partial loss of thrust vector control
such that the nozzle deflects from its correct
position and obtains a new null position which
results in a constant or slowly changing moment
on the missile, or from a reference axis re
alignment in the guidance system such that a
new orbital plane results.

Hazard Evaluation
The hazard study attempts to determine
quantitatively the risks involved in a flight
which violates the normal range safety criterion.
It does this by analyzing the types of failure
which may lead to a hazard,and assigning a prob
ability of occurrence to these. It seeks to
determine what the probability of impact is should
these failures in fact occur. (Reference 1 presents
one method of determining the probability of impact.)
It also attempts to estimate the number of
casualties resulting from an impact. Approval
of the flight is contingent upon acceptability of
the risks by the range from economic, political,
and humanitarian bases.
The types of failure which may occur are
analyzed on the basis of their effects on range
safety. These have been categorized into five
general failure modes'. These are defined as:
a. A premature thrust termination (PIT) is
defined as complete loss of thrust by the vehicle
at any time prior to that required to reach the
intended impact point or orbit. It may be caused
by, among other reasons, failure of the engine,
breakup of the stage, burn through of the case on
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d. A thrust termination failure (TTF) is
defined as failure to terminate the thrust at
the time that impact would occur at the intended
impact point and excludes the premature thrust
termination category. It may be occasioned by
the computer issuing late or failing to issue
the thrust termination command, by failure to
release the thrust termination ports or operate
the propellant valving, or by other causes.
e. A deviant missile (DM) or abnorma1
mi ss ? le (AM) is defined as one which flies with
out the 3-sigma limits of the intended flight
path. That is, it exceeds the 3-sigma boundaries
of the ground track of a nominal missile. It may
be caused by deviant performance of the guidance
or propulsion systems.
The factors contributing to these failure
modes must be determined (unless one uses the
maximum hazards concept), and the probability
of occurrence of the failure mode evaluated.
From the probability of occurrence, the prob
ability of impact and the estimated number of
casualties can be determined. To properly do so,
an analysis of missile breakup under the
conditions of intentional destruction during
flight, unintentional destruction during flight,
and reentry must be conducted; the survivabi1ity
and dispersion of the pieces resulting from
breakup must be calculated; and the lethal area
obta ined.

Before exemplifying a typical failure mode,
the concept of miss coefficients will be
introduced. The miss coefficients merely express
the relationship between velocity perturbations
or variations and the resulting change in the
impact location. Figure 10 illustrates this
pictorially and mathematically in the form of
matrices. For small perturbations in velocity
near the nominal burnout conditions, the approxi
mation matrix is generally satisfactory. The
coefficients are usually generated by using the
nominal velocity vector and impact location as
starting points. The coordinate systems can be
chosen such that AVX is in the direction of the
velocity vector, A^z ' s perpendicular to &\lx and
lies in the vertical plane containing Vx and A^y
is perpendicular to both AVX and A^Z' The
direction of DR is usually chosen as an extension
of the arc of the great circle connecting the
launch point with the target, and the direction
of CR is along the great circle perpendicular to
DR at the target. By perturbing the velocity
vector along one of the three directions at a
time and determining the change in impact location,
the effect of incremental velocity changes in each
of the three directions on the downrange and crossrange directions can be ascertained.
The mode of failure chosen exempli gratia is
the hard-over tumble. The HOT can, of course,
occur in any plane. Since the largest area is
enhazarded when the HOT occurs in yaw only, a
yaw-only HOT is usually the one considered.
(The effects of a HOT in pitch only are similar,
from a range safety standpoint, to a PTT, except
that the IIP locus oscillates upon itself.) The
dynamics and equations involved in a HOT are
shown in Figure 11, and the resulting angular
deflection of the velocity vector is shown in
Figure 12. (Figure 12 shows only the typical
curve for a maximum engine deflection. Similar
curves are also generated for other, smaller,
constant engine deflections, and these curves
have increasingly greater maximum amplitudes and
lower frequencies of oscillation with decreasing
engine deflection angles. The envelope of these
turns define the limits of the velocity vector
turn capability of the missile and therefore the
maximum lateral deviation of the IIP from the
nominal.) The incremental velocities in the
direction of the initial velocity vector define
a Cornu spiral, as shown in Figure 13. Conse
quently, the IIP describes a Cornu spiral upon
the surface of the earth. Because the sensi
tivity of the IIP to velocity changes is greater
in the downrange than in the crossrange direction
(the ratio depending upon when in flight the
failure occurs), the IIP spiral is distorted as
shown in Figure 13« From a series of tumble
turn graphs like Figure 12, varying only in the
time the failure is assumed to start, a tumble
corridor can be calculated which defines the
limits of crossrange excursion of the IIP as a
result of a HOT at any time during .powered
flight, and impact as a result of a HOT will
occur within the extremes established by the
crossrange and downrange excursions of the IIP,

if the missile remains intact.
The question of missile integrity during a
HOT must be examined next. If the missile is
endoatmospheric at the time of failure, aero
dynamic loads will most probably predominate, and
cause the resultant breakup when and if it occurs.
If the missile is exoatmospheric, the inertial
loads are predominant, and the resulting breakup
may differ from that resulting from aerodynamic
loading. The method of breakup must be examined,
to determine whether incremental velocities are
added to the pieces from alleviation of tank
pressures or from the resulting propellant burn
ing, and if there are, the magnitudes of the
velocities. This means that the amounts and
characteristics of the propellants must be known.
From the incremental velocities and drag and miss
coefficients, the resulting dispersions of pieces
can be determined.
Before this is done, however, the survivability of the pieces must be determined. To
properly do so, the thermal characteristics of
the piece and heat loads the piece is subjected
to must be known. Experience has shown that the
greater number of pieces will survive the reentry
environment. This includes such things as pieces
of missile skin. The protection afforded some
parts of the pieces entering by the leading face
of the piece contributes to the survivabi1ity.
Heat capacity, heat transmission, and heat
radiation are among the things which must be
taken into account in the study on the survival
of pieces.
As a prerequisite for estimating the number «
of casualties, the lethal area must be determined.
The lethal area is defined as that area surround
ing the impact location of a piece which, if
occupied by a human being, will result in death
or injury of that person. It has been customary
to assume total exposure in that area; i.e., no
allowance has been made for possible complete or
partial protection of the inhabitant of the area
(by trees, houses, etc.)? nor has the terrain
(sandy, mountainous, rocky, loam, clay, etc.)
been considered. For a conservative estimate,
this is the better approach, since it tends to put
an upper bound upon the estimated casualties. It
may in the future be advisable to account for the
probability of complete or partial protection,
and for the terrain, although the terrain affects
the distribution of population throughout the
world. For instance, mountainous and desert
regions are usually more sparsely populated than
are fertile plains, coastal areas, and navigable
waters. The type of terrain may already be com
pensated for by the natural population distri
bution.
After determining the probability of
occurrence of a failure mode and the survivabi1ity
of a piece, the probability of impact of one or
more pieces upon any land area can be calculated.
Knowing the probability of impact, the lethal
area, and the population distribution within the
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land area under consideration, the
estimated number of casualties can be
computed. Having these data, the range
is then in a position to weigh the risk
involved in the launch against the
objectives to be gained from the flight,
and may waive or not waive the range safety
requirements dependent upon the evaluation
presented to it.
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